Adoption assistance entitlements support the adoptions of children whose birth parents' rights have been severed after abuse or neglect. The subsidies are meant to offset the extra cost to adoptive families of raising children whose adverse experiences have left them with special physical, emotional, or behavioral needs. Previous studies of adoption assistance are limited in scope; I use administrative data on all recorded adoptions from foster care from 1996 through 2003 to examine the distribution of adoption assistance across and within states. The state-tostate variation payments is large, even after controlling for differences in the cost of living. Moreover, although adoption assistance is an entitlement for children, payments made within many states are systematically correlated with the characteristics of adoptive families. There is substantial evidence that the state administration of this federal entitlement leads to unequal treatment of similar children.
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The Distribution of a Federal Entitlement:
The Case of Adoption Assistance
Introduction
States are currently responsible for finding adoptive families for almost 120,000 children in foster care (US DHHS, 2006a) . These children are victims of abuse and neglect by their birth parents and are subjected to the inherent insecurity of placement in foster care. Family courts have ruled (or will soon rule) that the children's best interests are served by severing their birth parents' rights, freeing the children for adoption by families that are willing to help them find the places in society and the economy that most other children take for granted.
Through a combination of federal and state laws, an adoptive family willing to parent one of these children can be reimbursed for the upfront expenses of the adoption, including administrative and legal fees. A family can receive a substantial one-time tax credit to help establish the child's place in the family home. The child can receive Medicaid, and the family can receive assistance with extraordinary expenses related to the child's special needs. Finally, the child may be entitled to receive a monthly adoption assistance payment that the family may use to help defray the cost of raising the child to independence.
More active use of adoption assistance, together with other changes in child welfare law, policy, and practice, led to a near-doubling in the number of children adopted from foster care in the 1990s, as shown in figure 1. While every adopted child is not entitled to adoption assistance, most are, so the increase in adoptions caused the number of entitled children to grow rapidly. In 1988, just fewer than 35,000 children received adoption assistance (Sedlak and Broadhurst, 1993) . The number may near 140,000 children by 2010 (Wulczyn and Hislop, 2002) .
Federal expenditure on adoption assistance has grown more than 2,000 times in the last two decades, from less than $400,000 in fiscal year 1981 to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2002 (Dalberth et al., 2005) . The federal adoption assistance budget grew 30 percent between 2000
and 2002 alone and is expected to approach $2.5 billion by 2008 (Barth et al., 2006; Scarcella et al., 2004) .
But adoption is less expensive for government than long term foster care. Adoption decreased administrative costs by $1.6 billion compared to continued foster care for the children adopted between 1983 and 1986 (Sedlak and Broadhurst, 1993 . The governmental cost of adoption may be less than half the cost of foster care (Barth et al., 2006) , and movement towards contracting out adoption services to private agencies continues to improve cost efficiency (Blackstone et al., 2004) . Moreover, the benefits of adoption are not merely fiscal. Adoption improves health, behavioral, educational, and employment outcomes for children relative to keeping them in long-term foster care (Triseliotis, 2002) . It is because adoption is a wise investment in children that states, and eventually the federal government, established the adoption assistance entitlement.
Just as higher maintenance payments increase the quantity of foster parenting supplied (Delfabbro and Barber, 2004; Simon, 1975) , adoption assistance has a positive effect on the number of families who choose to adopt from foster care (Dalberth et al., 2005; Hansen, 2005; Hansen and Hansen, 2006) . States cannot afford to retreat from a policy of supporting adoptions if they hope to meet the needs of the children waiting in foster care. (Dalberth et al., 2005) . Moreover, in most states and in most cases, the basic rates are used as a guide, but the amount of adoption assistance is negotiated on a case-by-case basis. While the intent of allowing negotiation is to provide flexibility, the result is that similar children are not similarly treated (Avery and Ferraro, 1997; Avery and Mont, 1992; Hansen and Pollack, 2005) .
Previous studies of adoption assistance are limited to single states or single years. Here I produce the most comprehensive description possible, using data on all adoptions finalized after state agency involvement during fiscal years 1996 through 2003, as reported to the Children's Bureau through the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).
The next sections summarize the history of the adoption assistance and the AFCARS adoption data. I then describe the extent of state claims for federal funds for adoption assistance and the distribution of the amount of adoption assistance. Following the descriptive statistics, I
turn to the question of equal treatment in the distribution of adoption assistance payments. The characteristics of the adoptive family have predictive power in a logit model of receipt of adoption assistance and contribute to explaining the amounts of the payments in a fixed effects model. program to make it possible for a family to adopt a child with special needs without a decline in the standard of living of the family (Avery and Ferraro, 1997; Barth, 1997) .
The federal match for adoption assistance removed the disincentive for states to move children from foster care into adoptive families. Further, because the Act based eligibility on the characteristics of the child rather than characteristics of the adoptive parents, it de-stigmatized adoption assistance.
States receive federal reimbursement at the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) for the adoption assistance payments made to families. The FMAP rates currently range from 50 to 76 percent (US DHHS, 2006d). States with lower per capita income have higher matching rates, while states with higher per capita income have lower matching rates. The federal reimbursement for adoption assistance is capped at the maximum reimbursement for foster care payments that could be made on behalf of the child.
Higher adoption subsidies can be paid using state or local dollars. Also, if the child to be adopted is not Title IV-E eligible, the state may fund adoption assistance from its own budget.
Each state's budget for adoption assistance is appropriated by the state's legislature.
A study of families who adopted children from foster care in the mid-1980s found that 29 percent said that they would have had had difficulty adopting their child(ren) without the subsidy, and 35 percent said the availability of assistance had a positive influence on the decision to adopt. Twenty percent of families said that, despite adoption assistance, the child had to do without needed services or treatment because of tight family budgets; 28 percent of families reported borrowing money to provide care for the adopted child (Sedlak and Broadhurst, 1993) .
A 2005 survey found that nearly 60 percent of adoptive parents said that they would not have been able to adopt without adoption assistance. Among prospective adoptive parents, 45 percent said they would not adopt without it. (Children's Rights, 2006) .
Whether adoption assistance provides adequate financial support for families who adopt children with special needs is an unanswered question. States and localities design adoption assistance programs differently. Some set rates high enough to provide general support and needed special services. Others set rates that support only basic care for a child and require that families request funds separately for needed special services. The NACAC reported that in the late 1990s the basic adoption assistance rates in four states were slightly greater than the United
States Department of Agriculture [USDA] estimates of the cost of raising a child in a lowincome family. In three states the basic state subsidy was half the USDA estimate (Bower and Laws, 2002) . In the county-administered system of New York State, 52 of 57 counties provided adoption assistance payments less than the USDA's child-cost estimate (Avery and Ferraro, 1997) . Of course, these comparisons underestimate the adequacy of adoption assistance payments because the cost of raising an adopted child with special needs is likely to exceed the cost of raising a healthy child. Direct outlay for care of the child plus the opportunity cost of lost time at work may be substantial.
The AFCARS Adoption Data
Congress prodded states to increase adoptions from foster care though the Adoption Incentive program articulated in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89). To qualify for Adoption Incentive payments, states had to document increases in adoptions.
Effectively this required states to come into compliance with a federal rule issued in 1993 requiring the submission of data on adoptions with state agency involvement (Maza, 2000) . The data collection system is known as the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS). The data are tabulated annually by the Children's Bureau. The Children's Bureau publishes tabulations on the Web and in an annual outcomes report (e.g. US DHHS, 2006c). The data used to produce the outcomes report form the basis for the public use version of the data, although the public use version may include updates made later by the states.
States are required to submit data for each adoption in which a public child welfare agency was involved in any way. Although states are encouraged to submit data for other adoptions, little has been submitted. The analysis here is limited to cases with state agency involvement.
Limitations of the Data
The Children's Bureau puts little faith in the AFCARS data for 1995 through 1997. Although the first years of data are suspect, AFCARS represents the only source of caselevel data on adoptions with state agency involvement that is consistent in format across almost all states and over time. Moreover, at least at the state level, the AFCARS count for fiscal year 1996 is highly correlated with data reported through other sources .
National Trends in Adoption Assistance
Since fiscal year 1996, states have claimed federal Title IV-E reimbursement for, on average, 69 percent of adoptions from foster care (table 1) were recorded with $0 subsidy payments. 6 Among states that submitted AFCARS data in 1996, 18 failed to support more than one-third of adoptions with a subsidy.
As was the case with Title IV-E claims, there was an abrupt change from fiscal year 1997
to fiscal year 1998 in the proportion of cases made without a monthly payment recorded. 7 The proportion with no support exceeded 35 percent in 1996, but fell to 17 percent in 1998. After 1998, the proportion of adoptions with state agency involvement but without adoption assistance held steady at 12 to 13 percent. The precipitous fall is evident in figure 2 , where the trend appears as a mirror image of increasing Title IV-E claims. Although the upper tail of the distribution is relatively thin, there was a noticeable increase in its thickness over time: there were three times more adoption assistance agreements made at the highest amounts in the later years than in the earlier years. An exceptionally high monthly payment may be the result of effort to meet the needs of children with expensive-tosupport disabilities, or it may be the result of negotiation between the adoptive parent and the child welfare authority. Again, although some states stick to a fairly rigid schedule in the determination of adoption assistance, most jurisdictions use the basic rates as a guide and determine the actual payments on a case-by-cases basis.
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Among adoptions with any support, less support is given to adoptions for which no federal reimbursement was claimed. If the recorded adoption assistance subsidy is greater than zero and the child is not Title IV-E eligible, it implies that the subsidy supporting the adoption is funded entirely at the state and local level. From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003, a total of 46,714 adoptions (almost 15 percent) fit this category; these adoption cases have positive values of monthly adoption subsidy but Title IV-E assistance was not claimed. Table 4 shows the percent and number of cases for which a state-funded adoption assistance payment was recorded. The prevalence of state-funded adoption assistance payments has risen from 13.3 percent of adoptions in 1996 to 19.9 percent in 2003. Table 4 shows that, averaging across years, state-funded adoption assistance is $40 dollars less than when the federal government pays a share. The next section of the paper begins with a discussion of the role of Title IV-E eligibility in the determination of adoption assistance receipt and amount.
Case Characteristics and Adoption Assistance
The probability of receiving adoption assistance is expected to depend upon whether the state can be reimbursed through the federal program. If the child is Title IV-E eligible, then we expect the probability of subsidy to be higher than if she is not. The effect of claiming Title IV-E reimbursement on the probability of receiving adoption assistance is positive, as shown in the first column of table 5. This column reports the marginal effects from a logit estimation that includes fixed effects for state. Most of the work of predicting the probability of receipt is done by this single variable. The cost to the state of supporting any particular adoption is higher, and likelihood of assistance receipt is lower, if the state's basic rate is higher.
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Since children must have a state-designated special need for the state to claim Title IV-E reimbursement, it is not obvious that special needs designations should have any additional impact on the probability of receipt. The marginal effects of the special needs designations and recorded disabilities, however, are positive and disabilities are mostly positive. Having a special need of older age or having siblings who also need an adoptive family adds the most to the likelihood of receiving adoption assistance. However, all other things equal, a child who is mentally retarded or has a visual or hearing impairment is less likely to receive adoption assistance.
The key question is whether, after accounting for the characteristics of the child, the characteristics of the adoptive family has an impact on the probability of receiving adoption assistance. Avery and Ferraro (1997) argue that the differences in subsidy support cannot be well explained by the characteristics of the children. Hansen and Pollack (2005) argue that the bargaining power that the adoptive family feels they have relative to the child welfare authority influenced the likelihood and amount of adoption assistance payments in 2001.
After controlling for the characteristics of the child, children adopted by single parents, as compared to married or unmarried couples, are less likely to receive adoption assistance.
Children adopted by kin are also less likely to receive support. This is consistent with earlier findings (Geen, 2003 , for example) and may reflect historical differences in the way states view kinship care (Dalberth et al., 2005) .
The estimated effects of the case characteristics on the monthly amount of the adoption assistance, given that assistance is received, are shown in column 2 of table 5. 12 The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly adoption assistance subsidy. The method of estimation is fixed effects using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the Huber/White/sandwich VCE estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity within states.
If the state can claim Title-IV-E reimbursement on behalf of the child, the adoption assistance payment is 16 percent higher than if reimbursement cannot be claimed. Increases in the state basic rate are not passed through one-to-one to negotiated rates. Specific disabilities increase the amount of the monthly payment from two to seven percent, but special needs designations do not increase payments much.
As in the logit model, the fixed effects model shows that family characteristics play a role in distribution of adoption assistance, even after controlling for child characteristics. A child adopted by kin receives 10 percent less than a child adopted by his or her foster parents.
Children who are adopted by adults with whom they had no prior relationship receive 12 percent less than children adopted by their foster parents. Children adopted by single women receive about one percent more than those adopted by couples; children adopted by single men receive about one percent less.
The fixed effects results hint at the extent of unequal treatment in the distribution of the adoption assistance entitlement, but they cannot adequately describe differences between states common coefficients across states (here on the log of the basic rate) and random coefficients (on the other case characteristics) in the same model. That the coefficients are treated as random means that they are allowed to differ across states as the result of a stochastic process; in other words, the model specifically allows the system of determination of adoption assistance to be unique to each state. The coefficients reported in column 3 of table 5 are the weighted averages of the OLS coefficients, where the weights are proportional to the covariance matrices of the OLS coefficients. 13 The values in parentheses are the estimates of the variances of the processes generating the coefficients; they do not describe the sampling distribution of the estimator.
The estimated variances of the processes are large. The hypothesis that the true effects of case characteristics on adoption assistance payments are the same across states is rejected, at a high level of confidence. 14 The coefficients cannot be adequately described by their point estimates-such as the ones reported in column 2 of table 5-because they are unlikely to have been generated by identical processes in each state.
To further assess the importance of administrative differences, I considered the results of separate OLS regressions for each state. The individual state regressions are of the general form presented in column 2 of table 5. Table 6 summarizes the range of the estimated coefficients in the individual state regressions. At least one state had a negative coefficient on each case characteristic, while others had positive coefficients. The widest range in effects of characteristics of the children was for children with special medical needs. The widest range in effects of characteristics of the adopted family was for children adopted by single fathers.
Finally, for each case characteristic, the distribution of the coefficients had at least one thick tail, that is, the wide range of values is not the product of just one outlier. For each of the coefficients, at least 15 states had estimated coefficients outside two standard deviations from the average.
Conclusion
Clearly the state administration of the federal adoption assistance entitlement program generates unequal support for children adopted from foster care and the families who step forward to take responsibility for them. In the past, state control has been advocated as a way to enable states to increase the pool of local families to meet local need. Yet there remain many states with more waiting children than approved families, while other states have more families than waiting children Wilson, Katz, and Geen, 2005) . Congress has recognized the need to improve the system that supports the interstate placements of children (US GAO, 1999) ; it may also be wise for Congress to consider imposing a national structure on the adoption assistance program to ensure that the needs of all children waiting in foster care are met. A next step for research, then, is to examine whether states that follow a strict formula for allocation of adoption assistance payments create more adoptions than states that spend resources bargaining over adoption assistance. Source: Calculation of author from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data. Source: Calculation of author from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data. 2 States may also offer deferred payment agreements, which allow families in the adoption data the option of negotiating a subsidy at a later date even if they do not opt to receive the subsidy at the time of adoption. I treat the 528 deferrals in the data as non-receipt. In 1983 federallyfunded adoption assistance became portable across state lines. In 1986, reimbursement for nonrecurring expenses such as the home study and legal fees were added to Title IV-E. Also in 1986, Congress allowed Medicaid-only adoption assistance grants and guaranteed their portability across state lines. In 1997, Congress added that once a child had become entitled to adoption assistance, the entitlement would follow the child even if an adoption disrupted so that subsequent adoptive families were assured of receiving adoption assistance.
3 The User's Guide and Codebook states: "Adoptions finalized in years prior to FY 1998 are not being updated because most states indicated that those data were not credible" (NDACAN, p. 9).
4 Most of the missing observations are for New York State. Very incomplete data for five or more out of the seven years used here are from Illinois, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.
5 Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, and Vermont requested IV-E reimbursement in about 80 percent of cases. These states were among those that paid the highest amounts of assistance.
Five states made Title IV-E claims in less than 40 percent of adoptions. 6 The states are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico. 7 The change is so abrupt in a few states (such as Delaware and Minnesota) that it likely due to inaccuracies in the AFCARS data. However, removing these states from the analysis does not change the overall upward trend in the proportion of adoptions supported. 8 Children who were younger than one year old at the time of finalization were least likely to be placed with adoption assistance. All age groups exhibit an increasing trend in the likelihood of support with an adoption subsidy. 11 The basic subsidy rate for each child is calculated as the nearest age-specific rate available in the NACAC archive of State Adoption Subsidy Profiles. Dalberth, et al. (2005) find that the FMAP rate matters, but I find that the FMAP rate does not have an effect independent of its effect on the basic rate.
12 Although selection on observables is clear, it is reasonable to wonder about selection on unobservables. No adequate instrument is available in the AFCARS data set, so no traditional selection correction model can be applied. Given the success of the complete logit model (see table 5 ), and following the argument of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) , the degree of selection on the unobervables would have to be many times greater than the selection on observables in order for selection bias to be large enough to account for the entirety of the effect of family characteristics on adoption assistance payments.
13 Ignoring the year effects for simplicity of notation, the mixed model is regression equation is 
